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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis provides a general introduction to storage area networking, the Fibre 
Channel protocol and SCSI, as well as why enterprises use SAN attached storage 
array subsystems today. The focus is on the security of storage area networking. 
The objective of the thesis was to study and test in practice the possibility to 
eavesdrop a Fibre Channel Storage Area Network. The tests were conducted by 
sniffering the fiber optic cables by breaking the optical link and placing an optical 
splitter in between to establish connectivity for the sniffering device to capture 
data frames from the link. Also, there were tests to actually sniffer data frames 
without breaking the optical link, by using clip-on couplers, which are available 
from the internet for less than USD 1000. Also stealing data was tested by WWN 
spoofing. 
Another topic of study and testing in the thesis was Brocade Encryption Switch, 
which is a Fibre Channel switch with encryption engines to provide data-at-rest 
encryption. The management of data encryption key was also studied. It was 
tested whether data is actually encrypted after being redirected through the 
encryption engine and whether the encrypted logical disk device is really 
ciphertext and includes the metadata that is documented by Brocade Encryption 
Switch documentation. 
The thesis proved that it is possible for an attacker to sniffer data payload from a 
Fibre Channel link and for example steal a hashed root password for the linux 
server booting from SAN. Sniffering without breaking the circuit was not 
successful in this thesis, but is definitely possible. Also stealing data with WWN 
spoofing is possible, but it seems to require good luck or other attack vectors to 
force original WWN to logout from the SAN fabric. 
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TIIVISTELMÄ 
 
Opinnäytetyö antaa yleiskuvauksen tallennusverkoista, FibreChannel- ja SCSI-
protokollista sekä siitä miksi suuret ja keskisuuret yritykset käyttävät SAN-
tallennusjärjestelmiä tänä päivänä. 
Tavoitteena oli tutkia ja testata, kuinka helppoa on varastaa dataa 
salakuuntelemalla FibreChannel-verkkoa katkaisemalla optinen kuitulinkki ja 
jakaa valosignaali prismalla laitteelle, jolla optista linkkiä voidaan kuunnella ja 
analysoida. Lisäksi testattiin käytännössä varastaa data samasta kuitulinkistä 
katkaisematta linkkiä missään vaiheessa käyttäen kaapelin vaipan päälle 
naksautettavia signaalin jakajia, joita voi löytää internetistä alle USD 1000. 
Lopuksi testattiin vielä datan varastamista väärentämällä palvelintietokoneen 
kuitukortin WWN-osoite. 
Opinnäytetyössä tutustuttiin Brocade Encryption Switch Fibre Channel-kytkimeen 
ja testattiin sitä. Kytkin pystyy kryptaamaan sen läpi kulkevan liikenteen 
levyjärjestelmään. Tämän lisäksi tutkitaan kryptauksen kanssa käytettävää 
salausavainten hallintajärjestelmää. Opinnäytetyön lopussa testattiin, että data on 
todella salattua sen jälkeen kun Fibre Channel-kehykset on reititetty 
salausmoottorin lävitse levyjärjestelmään, sekä tarkasteltiin salatun levyn 
metadataosiota ja verrattiin sitä Brocaden dokumentaatioon aiheesta. 
Opinnäytetyössä todistetaan, että hyökkääjän on mahdollista tallentaa data 
FibreChannel -linkistä ja esimerkiksi varastaa tätä kautta tiivistetty pääkäyttäjän 
salasana Linux-palvelimelle, jonka käyttöjärjestelmä on SAN-verkossa olevalla 
levyllä. Datan varastamisessa ilman että kuitulinkkiä katkaistaan ei onnistuttu, 
mutta on selvää, että se on mahdollista. Lisäksi todetaan, että datan varastaminen 
WWN-osoitetta väärentämällä on mahdollista, mutta ilmeisesti tarvitaan hyvää 
onnea tai muiden hyökkäysvektoreiden käyttöä, jotta alkuperäisen WWN-
osoitteen käyttäjän saa poistettua SAN-verkon osasta. 
Asiasanat: Fibre Channel, SAN, BES, kryptaus, tietomurto, tallennus 
ABBREVIATIONS 
AES Advanced Encryption Standard 
BES Brocade Encryption Switch 
CTC Crypto Target Container 
DEK Data Encryption Key 
FC Fibre Channel 
FCID Fibre Channel Identifier 
FCP Fibre Channel Protocol 
FDISC Fabric Disconnect, FCP Primitive 
FLOGI Fabric Login, FCP primitive 
HBA Host Bus Adapter. In this context, it is practically FC I/O adapter. 
KEK Key Encryption Key 
LBA Logical Block Address. In this context, always 512 Byte block 
 address. 
LU Logical Unit 
LUN Logical Unit Number 
MK Master Key 
NAS Network Attached Storage 
SAN Storage Area Network, network dedicated for storage traffic 
WWN World Wide Name 
WWNN World Wide Node Name 
WWPN World Wide Port Name 
KMS Key Management System 
SFP Small Form Pluggable 
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 1 INTRODUCTION 
How much money is there in one's bank account? That information is stored in the 
bank’s datacenter, in a server, in a database. The bank’s web site forces the use of 
strong authentication, as well as the HTTPS protocol, to access the bank’s web 
server to make bank transactions. Therefore there is no need to worry about 
someone eavesdropping traffic in between? But what is the encryption between 
the web server and the database? Does it matter if they are located in the same 
datacenter, and can one assume its physical security is implemented properly? 
There are things to worry about. To keep banking account information highly 
available to users, banks obviously need to be prepared for a disaster in one 
datacenter. Therefore it is likely that the databases are being replicated to another 
location. So if one datacenter experiences for example a power supplying failure, 
servers in the other location can carry on providing the banking information 
service. Naturally the methods how this replication is being done are not public. 
IT hosting companies for example tend to use enterprise storage array subsystems 
and related technologies to mirror data to another storage array on another site. 
The protocol commonly used for that traffic is Fibre Channel inside optical fiber 
cable. 
So, maybe there is dedicated optical fiber cable installed between the bank’s two 
datacenters. No matter if you run the Ethernet or Fibre Channel protocol in it, it 
seems to be considered a private physical link layer that no one else can access. 
The risk in such an assumption could be that encryption is forgotten. Another 
dangerous assumption could be related to intrusion detection, as there must be 
interruption to the data traffic when a traffic monitoring device is inserted to the 
cable. Optical fiber cables are coated, so the light inside cannot be monitored, 
except by cutting the cable, inserting a monitoring device in between and then 
reconnecting the link. 
Let us make the hypothesis that there is a Storage Area Network (SAN) based on 
Fibre Channel (FC), which is not encrypted and data is sent across two locations 
as plain text. Then somehow an attacker is able to capture data flow without 
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disrupting the data traffic. Is secret data stolen? This sounds simple to prove, so 
such hacking will be tested later in this thesis. 
If the data is encrypted in our hypothetical situation, does it make it more difficult, 
maybe even impossible, to steal data? However, it must be understood that if the 
data was stored to a database, it is obvious that someone wants to read that 
encrypted data later. Therefore it must be decrypted some day and there is going 
to be a key or algorithm to do it. 
Another hypothesis is that the attacker is able to breach physical security and 
steals everything from the datacenter, including fibre channel switches, disk 
storage array, and servers or appliances that may contain encryption key store. 
Can secret data be stolen? 
This thesis will study the possibility to eavesdrop a Fibre Channel Storage Area 
Network. The possibility to eavesdrop such a network without being noticed will 
be also studied. After studying these topics in theory, the goal of the thesis is to 
build a sample environment with storage and servers attached together with Fibre 
Channel. The sample environment allows eavesdropping tests in practice. The 
thesis will also study the Brocade Encryption Switch (BES) solution together with 
encryption key management, and implement it as proof of concept to the sample 
environment. 
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2 WHAT IS STORAGE AREA NETWORK? 
The acronym SAN stands for Storage Area Network, which is a high performance 
network whose primary purpose is to enable storage resources to communicate 
with computer systems. Storage resource can be for example diskdrive, disk 
subsystem or tapedrive. The definition of SAN does not take into account whether 
physical cabling is made by using twisted pair wire or optical cable, neither it does 
not take into accout what data transfer protocol is being used. It can be TCP/IP or 
FCP or something else. (Barker, Massiglia 2002, 3-6.) 
An example SAN is represented in Figure 1, where SAN is formed by two Fibre 
Channel (FC) switches using Fibre Channel Protocol (FCP) to communicate. The 
SAN in Figure 1 also has one Local Area Network (LAN) switch that 
communicates by Ethernet. The physical layer for both technologies can be fiber 
optic cables, but for Ethernet it can be twisted pair cables also. Some protocols 
above Ethernet are sometimes referred to with acronym NAS, which stands for 
Network Attached Storage. The term is used mainly for NFS and CIFS protocols 
operating above the TCP/IP layer (Farley 2001, 24). The SAN term is commonly 
used for block-access storage, which is often storage subsystems providing logical 
units of storage, which behave as local disk drive from the client’s point of view 
(Barker, Massiglia 2002, 18). Enterprise backup software commonly uses tape 
drives that can also be connected through Fibre Channel SAN, like in Figure 1. 
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FIGURE 1. Abstraction of typical SAN 
SCSI was developed initially already in 1981 for disk drive interface called SASI. 
It was renamed as SCSI (small computer system interface) in 1986, when it 
became an official ANSI standard (Farley 2001, 14-15). SCSI is still widely used 
in server computers, though physical wiring has changed from the 1980s. 
2.1 Rationale for SAN attached storage 
Why do companies choose SAN? Barker and Massiglia (Barker, Massiglia 2002, 
4) state it simply saying “it is universal storage connectivity” and that computers 
are indeed connected to storage nowadays, but are all computers connected to all 
of its storage. SAN allows sharing disk storage with several servers 
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simultaneously, making it possible to quickly move business workload from one 
server computer to another without moving a large amount of data. Also, backups 
can be taken directly from disk-storage to disk-storage or from disk-storage to 
tape, so the server resources are not wasted to back up the valuable data. 
2.1.1 Deduplication and data compression for efficiency 
Today's storage subsystems are capable of finding duplicate data blocks and 
removing duplicate blocks to save space. This method is called deduplication. As 
an example, two server computers are installed to SAN storage and have the same 
operating system. Both servers will have 20 GB of storage space assigned. That 
would make a total of 40 GB of storage assigned. However, as it can be expected, 
the two server computers cannot differ from each other too much. Only the 
hostname, IP address and other small configuration parameters are different. If the 
storage array is capable of finding the duplicate blocks of storage, the other one 
can be replaced by a pointer. Such space saving mechanism is called 
deduplication. In this case deduplication would gain 99% space saving for the two 
installed servers. (Wollnik 2013.) 
Data compression is based on different algorithms to reduce used space, and 
methods vary between storage vendors. 
2.1.2 Thin provisioning 
By the thin provisioning technique, it is possible to allocate more storage space to 
server computers than actually available inside the storage array. For example two 
server computers are installed to SAN storage and the operating system is the 
same. Both servers will have 20 GB of storage space assigned; total amount of 
allocated storage would be 40 GB. Very often after installing the operating 
system, it only consumes about 5 GB of disk space. For the two servers it would 
be 10 GB of used storage. If the storage array does not have more than 40 GB of 
storage space that can be allocated, it would be full by now. However, if thin 
provisioning is used, it would still leave 30 GB available for other server 
computers. Combining this with the deduplication technique, it would actually 
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leave the server computers with nearly 35 GB available for futher allocation to 
server computers. 
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3 FIBRE CHANNEL STORAGE AREA NETWORKS 
Very often a server computer, as well as a personal computer has a local disk 
drive attached to it, like on the left-hand side in Figure 2. Three servers in Figure 
2 have local disks connected by an SCSI, SATA or SAS cable. One of the servers 
cabled by SATA is also using a RAID controller to mirror two disks and 
presenting the mirrored logical unit to the server as a single device. 
On the right-hand side in Figure 2, there are two servers that do not have local 
disks in the same case with the CPU and motherboard, but through a storage area 
network. Disks presented through SAN are similar local disks as for the three 
servers on the left hand side in Figure 2, but the cable is just extended over a 
distance. Logical devices are configured from a RAID array, which is called 
storage subsystem or storage array. 
SAN
Disk subsystem
SAN
SCSI
RAID-1
SATA SAS
FCP iSCSI
Hard Disk
Hard Disk Hard Disk
Hard Disk
Hard Disk
Hard Disk
Hard Disk
Hard Disk
Hard Disk
Hard Disk
Hard Disk
Hard Disk
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FIGURE 2. Comparison to local disks 
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3.1 RAID controller 
In a single computer there can be two disk drives, but they are used via a RAID 
controller. The controller can mirror or stripe data to two or more disks, providing 
either fault tolerance or high performance or both. A server computer with two 
100 GB disk drives and with a mirroring RAID controller distinguishes two disks 
into one single 100 GB disk to the operating system. The array continues to 
operate as long as there is at least one functional drive. The RAID controller is a 
kind of a volume manager. (Barker, Massiglia 2002, 92-93; Donald 2003.) 
Commonly used RAID levels are 0, 1, 5 and 6. However, there are also 
proprietary RAID levels such as RAID-DP developed by NetApp or Intel's Matrix 
RAID. RAID-0 stands for block level striping, without parity or mirroring. RAID-
0 with multiple disks provides performance over several disks, but does not offer 
protection from disk failure. RAID-1 stands for block level mirroring, and offers 
protection, while the performance is as fast as with one disk. RAID-5 stands for 
block level striping with distributed parity. RAID-5 requires at least 3 disks, 
providing performance over multiple disks, and is protected from a single disk 
failure. RAID-6 stands for block level striping with dual distributed parity. RAID-
6 is formed from minimum of 4 disks, providing performance, and is protected 
from two disk failures. 
3.2 Storage array subsystem 
Storage array subsystem is a complicated volume manager. One system can have 
hundreds of physical harddisk drives, often configured with different RAID 
levels. Logical units (LU) are sliced from the configured RAID groups and 
allocated to server computers. Figure 3 illustrates key points from a filesystem to 
a SAN attached storage subsystem with a bunch of disks. Logical unit (LU) is 
called virtual disk in Figure 3. Four physical disk drives in storage array can be 
configured as RAID-5 or RAID-1 or something else. Then, a chunk of the logical 
space is allocated as logical unit, also known as virtual disk. Virtual disks are then 
mapped to the server computer where the device driver makes it visible to the 
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operating system as a local disk drive. The filesystem can then be created to the 
local disk that is actually not local, at least not physically. 
 
FIGURE 3. Logical view of disk storage subsystem 
3.3 Logical Block Address (LBA) 
Each physical disk or logical unit is sliced into multiple blocks and each block is 
referred through block addresses. Block size, however, may vary depending on 
the filesystem, device driver and storage subsystem. For example, there is one 
logical unit allocated to a server computer with size of 1 MB, as illustrated with 
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virtual disks in Figure 3. One megabyte is 1048576 bytes. If the filesystem is 
formatted with 64 KB block size, the logical unit can be addressed throughout 
with 16 different LBAs. 64 KB multiplied by 16 equals 1 MB, and its LBA 
numbers are referred to as LBA0 … LBA15. 
However, the device driver under the filesystem (see figure 3) may not be using 
the same block size, so it actually accesses the virtual disk from the storage array 
with block size of 512 bytes. So the device driver sees 2048 logical block 
addresses for the virtual disk. That is LBA0 … LBA2047. 
Now, if the operating system needs to read data from the filesystem LBA0, the 
device driver will actually read data from its LBA0…LBA127 and pass the 
information to the filesystem. 
Classical Master Boot Record is generally written to the LBA0 of 512 bytes. Later 
in this document LBA size is always referred to as 512 bytes. 
3.4 Server connection to a storage array in FC SAN 
Basically, there are two kinds of objects in SAN connectivity: SCSI initiators and 
SCSI targets. Initiators are called Host Bus Adapters (HBA) on the computer or 
server side, while targets are storage subsystem adapters. Initiators and targets 
must be connected together in order to form connectivity. If a single physical 
harddisk drive is installed to a server or personal computer, it is connected by an 
SATA, SAS or SCSI cable to the computer's motherboard. On FC SAN cabling is 
done by fibre optic cables and connection between server and storage is 
commonly performed with a technique called zoning. It can be done without 
zoning as well, meaning that all initiators in the SAN can see all the targets and 
initiators in the network. 
One more key thing is to understand the meaning of the SAN fabric before we go 
deeper into how servers and storage connect. The SAN fabric is similar to a 
network segment in a local area network. SAN can have one or more fabrics. Very 
often there are two fabrics within a single SAN to provide fault tolerancy. Fabrics 
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do not interact together so they are isolated segments of their own. Very often 
fabrics are physically separated from each other. 
3.4.1 Host Bus Adapter (HBA) 
Host bus adapters are a kind of a network adapter that has a unique world-wide 
name, called World Wide Name (WWN). It has two portions. World Wide Node 
Name (WWNN) is unique for the adapter or server or storage device itself. World 
Wide Port Name (WWPN) is unique for a single physical port within the adapter 
or storage device. When HBA logs in to SAN, it will have FibreChannel ID 
(FCID) that is unique within the SAN fabric. This process is called FLOGI and 
happens only once when HBA logs in to the fabric. When HBA is moved to 
another port in the SAN switch or when the server is rebooted, FCID may or may 
not change in the FLOGI process. If there are no restrictions in the SAN as to 
what storage targets HBA can connect, it will log in to every SCSI target there is 
in the fabric. This process is called PLOGI and happens when a new storage target 
is about to be scanned for the HBA. 
3.4.2 World Wide Names 
Every node and port in the Fibre Channel fabric has a globally unique world-wide 
name. For nodes this is called World Wide Node Name (WWNN). For ports it is 
World Wide Port Name (WWPN). Globally unique WWNs are maintained by the 
IEEE organization together with hardware vendors. For example in Figure 4 there 
is one HBA with two ports. The HBA itself has a unique node name and both 
ports have a unique port name. WWN can be either 8 bytes or 16 bytes in size. 
Physical ports, such as server HBA, are using an 8-byte WWN identifier while 
logical units are using 16-byte WWN. (Butler 2007, 1-3). 
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Adapter’s WWNN: 
50:06:0b:20:00:c2:ff:05
Port1 WWPN: 
50:06:0b:20:00:c2:ff:02 Port2 WWPN: 
50:06:0b:20:00:c2:ff:04
Logical Unit’s WWN:
60:00:09:70:00:02:98:70:ff:ff:53:30:30:37:37:38  
FIGURE 4. WWN example 
3.4.3 Zoning 
Zoning is a technique that can be used to isolate initiators and targets from 
communicating to every node in the SAN. As stated in the previous chapter, there 
are several unique identifiers for devices in the SAN: WWPN, WWNN and FCID. 
These identifiers can be put as members of a zone. Each zone has members that 
can interact together, but not with members outside their zone. There are no 
restrictions as to what members can be within a zone, meaning that a single 
WWPN or FCID can be in all zones within the fabric if that is preferred. From 
those two, WWPN is a more flexible option to be used in zoning, because it does 
not depend on anything else than the HBA. If a server is moved to another 
location or SAN switch port, WWPN remains the same and zoning is valid after 
the change. If the server is moved to another location or SAN switch port, its 
FCID may change, and thus it requires modification to zone configuration. 
If server HBA fails and must be replaced, WWN is changed in HBA. If zoning 
was done with WWPN or WWNN, zoning must be reconfigured while FCID-
based zoning may not require such modifications. Zoning does not provide a 
security feature, it provides separation. (Tate, Lucchese, Moore 2006, 188-193.) 
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3.4.4 Masking logical disk device to a zoned initiator 
In most storage array subsystems it is not enough that a server computer is zoned 
to the array, masking to a logical disk device must also be defined. So far, HBA 
initiators and logical devices have been described, but one more object must be 
defined before the logical disk is available to the server operating system: Logical 
Unit Number (LUN). For each logical device to be mapped, a LUN number must 
be given. The LUN number should be unique for each initiator and per SCSI 
target, also known as storage array. Some storage arrays use the term host group 
or initiator group, which consist of initiator ID and LUN numbers for mapped 
logical devices. 
3.5 Multipath Input / Output 
An example of single point of failure is the SATA cable between a personal 
computer’s motherboard and harddisk drive. If the cable is cut, connection will 
fail. SAN is often designed to provide fault tolerance by having at least two 
fabrics that are separated from each other and designed so that a crash or failure of 
a single fabric does not affect input and output operations on the other fabric. So if 
two cables are placed in a personal computer to connect a single harddisk drive 
and motherboard, the operating system is likely to see two disks, while there is 
actually only one disk behind the cables. A similar issue is common on storage 
attached through SAN. However there are multipath IO drivers, which detect how 
many paths there are to a single logical device and the driver presents the 
multipath device as a single disk to the operating system. 
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4 BUSINESS CONTINUITY 
Some years ago when one visited a doctor, medical records were stored by using 
media called paper. The medical center or customer took care of storing this data 
in a secure way. It could mean storing the paper in a safe that is not vulnerable to 
fire or stealing. It could also mean that the paper was copied and stored in two 
different locations to make sure the medical record would not be lost, even if it 
was stolen and destroyed in another location. Business or public healthcare just 
has to work even after a disaster. This is called business continuity. 
Nowadays several government agencies and the banking sector are required to 
follow certain requlation on business continuity. The Finnish government sector 
follows the national security auditing criteria defined by NCSA-FI and the 
banking sector follows standards defined by the national financial supervisory 
authority, also known as Finanssivalvonta. (Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision 2011; Finanssivalvonta 2010; Ficora 2013.) 
4.1 Backup and disaster recovery 
By the nature of computer systems, data may get lost on several scenarios, for 
example human error, software error, hardware error and malware. Very often 
backup and disaster recovery are referred to as the same thing and in a way they 
are, but still are not. For example, the doctor needs to access a client’s medical 
record from the archive, but the single file is missing. The single file would be 
restored from the backup. It could be in another office or in another safe 
somewhere. But if the whole archive is lost, burnt for example, then restoring 
would be called disaster recovery and the method may be different. 
Methods to recover a single file or a whole archive may be the same, or may not. 
If a single file in the archive is 1 MB of size and the archive contains 500 files, it 
would not make a big difference to restore it from backup media that can perform 
the restore operation at the speed of 50 MB/s. Restoring a single file would take 
0.2 seconds while recovering the full archive would take 10 seconds. If the 
archive contains 8 million files, restoring the whole archive would take over 44 
hours at the speed of 50 MB/s. 
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The law or customer may define the recovery time objective less than 4 hours, 
abbreviated as RTO 4h. Recovering 8 million of 1 MB files from traditional 
backup media is not an option in such a scenario. Mirroring or synchronizing data 
to another storage array could be the solution, as well as some disaster recovery 
products, depending on the technology used to store the original archive. 
4.2 High availability and eavesdropping of SAN 
The Finnish financial supervisory authority has stated explicitly that those under 
supervision must minimize service interruptions even in the case of fire, flood, 
hardware failure or electricity outage (Finanssivalvonta 2010, 28). Fire, flood and 
electricity outage are the hard challenges to overcome; basically it means 
separating computer services to at least two different locations and failure 
domains. Then data must be continuously synchronized to another location several 
kilometers or hundreds of kilometers away from the primary location. When data 
is moved over distance, the physical security that was in place in the server room 
or within company facilities does not exist anymore. Optical cables are buried to 
the ground or installed to pipes or sewers. Anyone with enough interest can go to 
sewers or take a shovel to dig up the cable from its ducts. 
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5 PHOTONS OF INFORMATION 
5.1 Fibre Channel Protocol (FCP) 
Fibre channel is a transmission protocol just like Ethernet. Fiber channel is broken 
up into five layers, three physical layers and two upper layers. Layers are 
described in Figure 5. 
 
FIGURE 5. FCP layers (IBM redbook) 
The FC-0 layer in Figure 5 is commonly connected by fiber optic cables, which 
are divided into two different categories: single-mode and multi-mode. The 
difference between these two cable modes is how the light signal travels in the 
cable. Single-mode is used for long distances and is more expensive, because of 
laser sources. Multi-mode is used for short distances and the signal source can be 
made with cheaper electronics, such as light-emitting diodes (LED). Figure 6 
describes how the light signal travels in single-mode and multi-mode cables. Due 
to modal dispersion, multi-mode has higher pulse spreading rates than single 
mode fiber, limiting multi-mode's information transmission capacity. (ARC 
Electronics 2007.) 
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FIGURE 6. Two modes of optical cables (Tate et al 2006, 42) 
5.2 FC Frame and SCSI payload 
The size of the Fibre Channel frame may vary from 9 to 537 transmission words, 
where the size of each transmission word is of 40 bits. Transmission word is the 
smallest transmission unit defined in Fibre Channel. Transmission word consists 
of four transmission characters, each 10 bits. (Tate et al 2006, 46-57). 
Other rules that apply to the framing protocol are: 
 A frame is the smallest unit of information transfer. 
 A sequence has at least one frame. 
 An exchange has at least one sequence. 
 
  
Byte 0 Byte 1 Byte 2 Byte 3 
SOF TW 0 SOF 
Header 
TW 0 R_CTL Destination_ID (D_ID) 
TW 1 Reserved Source_ID (S_ID) 
TW 2 Type Frame Control (F_CTL) 
TW 3 SEQ_ID DF_CTL SEQ_CNT 
TW 4 Originator X_ID (OX_ID) Responder X_ID (RX_ID) 
TW 5 Parameter 
Payload 
TW0   
… 0… 2112 Bytes  
TW527   
CRC TW0 CRC 
EOF TW0 EOF 
FIGURE 7. Fibre Channel frame structure 
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In Figure 7, all data fields are referred to as bytes, as in 8 bits. As each 
transmission word (e.g TW0 in Figure 6) is 40 bits, while four bytes is only 32 
bits, the framing protocol will need to add fill bits. Fill bits are required to make 
8b/10b and 10b/8b encoding that will reveal possible parity and other errors. The 
fill bits are removed at the destination. (Tate et al 2006, 46-57). 
FC Payload in storage environments contains SCSI protocol commands and data. 
Commands often fit in just a few bytes, containing information about Logical Unit 
Number (LUN), whether it is going to be write- or read -I/O operation, Logical 
Block Address (LBA), priority and other information. SCSI data is just the data 
that is written to or read from the LUN LBA that was defined by the SCSI 
command. 
5.3 Stealing photons by placing a splitter in between 
There are devices called fibre optic splitters, sometimes referred to as couplers. 
These devices take in a light beam and split it into two or more light beams. In 
Figure 8, there is a splitter device with one input terminal and two output 
terminals. Both outputs are receiving the same light beam from the input terminal, 
but with a certain loss ratio. 
 
FIGURE 8. Fibre Optic splitter 
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So if one would like to steal data from an active optical link, the link must be 
broken and reassembled with a splitter in between. Once the splitter is in between, 
one can attach a sniffer or analyzer device to the splitter and eavesdrop the traffic 
that goes through the link. This metod is also called man-in-the-middle attack. 
However, this method is likely to cause an alarm event for the party responsible 
for the link, for example a link down or link up event. 
5.4 Stealing photons, undetected 
To do eavesdropping with a splitter device without breaking the original link, 
there are devices called fibre optic clip-on couplers or splitters. The Clip-on 
coupler method rely on bending the fibre optic cable just enough beyond a 
particular radius, so that a small amount of light leaks from the outer corner. A 
Clip-on device also attaches a glass prism through the cable coating to the optical 
cable core, allowing the attacker to steal the data traffic that flows through the 
optical link. 
Unlike a normal splitter, this method is likely to trigger no alarms, as proven in 
the Infosecurity show in London, 2007. This method did not make noise or errors 
to the line while data capturing was in progress (Leyden 2007). There are a few 
publicly known cases when such optic monitoring has been done. The security 
forces of the US found an illegal clip on splitter attached to Verizon’s network in 
2003 (BlackHat federal briefing 2003). Former intelligence officers in the US 
confirmed that NSA is able to monitor underwater fibre optics with a submarine 
that is placed over the cable (Zorpette 2001; BlackHat federal briefing 2003; The 
New York Times 2005). 
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6 ENCRYPTING DISK STORAGE IN SAN 
If encryption of disk data is made on the SAN layer, encryption is transparent for 
the host systems as well as for the storage arrays. The SAN Network layer in 
between makes the encryption, thus an encryption key is not required to be 
exposed to the host system and host accesses its data as plaintext. Meanwhile, the 
storage array does not need to know the encryption key, it can see data from the 
host system only as ciphertext. 
6.1 Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) 
Advanced Encryption Standard defines the FIPS-approved data encryption 
method implemented by Rijndael algorithm. AES is capable of using 
cryptographic keys of 128, 192 and 256 bits to encrypt and decrypt data in blocks 
of 128 bits. Rijndael was designed to handle additional block sizes and key 
lengths, such as 512 bits, but those are not in the standard. AES has survived 
numerous cryptanalytic tests and for ten years it has been the most popular 
cryptographic primitive. It is recognized as a very strong encryption algorithm. 
Recovering an AES cipher key requires a lot of computing power and it is 
considered nearly impossible nowadays. In 2011 a new algorithm was found, 
making it four times easier to recover the cipher key for AES, but it is still a long 
process to recover it. After these findings Andrey Bogdanov, crypto researcher 
from Leuven University, has given a practical example for how long it actually 
takes to recover the AES cipher key. If a trillion computer machines, which each 
could test a billion keys per second, would be used to recover the key, it would 
still take more than two billion years to recover an AES-128 key. (Federal 
Information Processing Standards Publication 2001; Neal 2011; Bogdanov, 
Khovratovich, Rechberger 2013.) 
6.2 Encryption Key life cycle management 
Disk data is encrypted and decrypted using the same Data Encryption Key (DEK), 
meaning that the key is symmetric. A practical synonym for symmetric key is 
password. The DEK must be preserved as long as there is a need to decrypt the 
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ciphertext that the DEK created. In some applications key management is 
complicated and multilayered and for such cases there are a number of key 
management systems provided by third-party vendors, such as Thales, RSA and 
Netapp for example (Wikipedia 2013). Key management then stores DEKs and 
can revoke, delete or backup the keys. If an encryption key is compromised or 
expired, a new key must be generated and data must be re-encrypted with the new 
key. This process is later referred to as re-key operation. If data must be stored for 
years or decades before it is accessed, and if several re-key operations have been 
issued in between, not only the DEKs must be available, but also identification of 
which backup copy was encrypted with a specific DEK. This identification can be 
made by giving an ID for each DEK. Some systems create this ID, by using 
Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA) and if ID is documented with each backup, proper 
DEK can be recovered according to this ID. (Brocade 2011, 7-10.) 
6.3 Data-at-rest encryption with multipath I/O 
Earlier in this thesis, multipathed input/ouput was described, where a server 
computer can access its logical unit through multiple paths, where different paths 
go through isolated fabrics. Fabrics are not connected together, resulting in highly 
available SAN connectivity where failure in one fabric does not affect the other 
fabrics. 
Multipath I/O makes it difficult for data-at-rest SAN encryption, because a host 
must encrypt and decrypt data traffic with the same data encryption key (DEK) on 
both fabrics. Failure to do so will result in data corruption because the same 
logical block address may be accessed in plaintext and ciphertext.  
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7 BROCADE ENCRYPTION SWITCH 
Brocade Encryption Switch, referred to as BES, is a network-based solution that 
secures data-at-rest for disk array LUNs and tape drives, using Advanced 
Encryption Standard (AES) 256-bit algorithms (AES-256). Encryption and 
decryption engines provide in-line encryption with up to 96 Gbps throughput for 
disk I/O. Disk I/O is a mix of ciphertext and cleartext traffic. 
As in a normal SAN network, connectivity between the server computer and 
storage array is made from physical initiator to physical target. BES hides 
physical end points from each other and replaces them with virtual initiator and 
virtual target (see Figure 9). Internal re-routing zoning makes sure physical 
initiator is able to communicate only with a virtual target. The encryption engine 
then encrypts the payload of the Fibre Channel frame and passes it to the physical 
target. 
 
FIGURE 9. Encryption engine's logical data flow (Brocade 2011, 8) 
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For each target used in encryption configuration, BES requires a configuration 
object called Crypto Target Container to be created, referred to as CTC. One CTC 
can contain only one target but multiple initiators and LUNs. When an initiator is 
added to a CTC, it will loose connectivity to its LUNs in the target, if the LUNs 
are not also added to the CTC. For each LUN added to a CTC, it must be defined 
whether this LUN is going to be encrypted, kept in plaint text or if it was already 
encrypted. 
When an initial encryption is performed to the LUN, BES writes its metadata to 
the LUN LBA range 1-16, including Data Encryption key ID, but not the key 
itself. LBA 0 is always cleartext, even for an encrypted LUN. Metadata is not 
visible to the host itself, but LBA range 1-16 of cource is. However, BES will 
handle I/O request to this region in the encryption software and the host will not 
know that physical LBA actually contain different data than the host is able to see 
from this LBA range. Metadata on the LUN is useful if the LUN is later cloned to 
another environment or data has to be restored from backup. (Brocade 2011, 185.) 
7.1 Data Encryption Key group (DEK-group) 
Data encryption key, referred to as DEK is a symmetric key that is used to encrypt 
and decrypt data. When a LUN is encrypted, BES will generate a data encryption 
key (DEK) for the LUN. DEK itself will be encrypted by key a encryption key 
(KEK). Brocade Encryption Switch may implement DEK encryption by KEK in 
two different ways, which are described more in later chapters of this thesis. 
When deploying a highly available SAN solution, multiple SAN fabrics are 
required to provide fault tolerance, as described earlier in this document. If a 
server computer had two paths to the storage like in Figure 10, but only one of 
these paths used a data encryption key to encrypt the data, it would result in read 
operations through Fabric 2 to seem like an I/O error or data corruption. It would 
be even worse if the data is later written back through Fabric 2 as plain text, while 
the other path decrypts this plain text with DEK. This would definitely result in a 
data corruption scenario. 
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Fabric 1
Encryption ON
Fabric 2
Encryption OFF
Write block
HELLO LAMK
Write block
B.%3dX0dB
Read block
B.%3dX0dB
Read block
B.%3dX0dB
 
FIGURE 10. Multiple paths with only one path configured for encryption 
To avoid data corruption and still provide multiple fabric solution, Brocade 
encryption switches can be configured to share data encryption keys within a 
group called an encryption group. An encryption group, also known as DEK 
group, is formed by two or more encryption engines that are connected to each 
other through a dedicated cluster I/O sync link, which uses the TCP/IP protocol. 
In order for encryption group members to communicate with each other, members 
must trust each other in the group. Trust relation is created by first configuring a 
single member as the group leader and importing certificate files from other 
members to it. Trust is then formed by configuring members for the group leader 
by defining a certificate file, world-wide-name for the member, as well as its I/O 
sync link IP address. The management network for the switches is physically 
separated from the I/O sync link, as seen in Figure 11. Once an encryption group 
is formed, encryption switches can share data encryption keys for a single LUN, 
allowing multipath I/O without data corruption. 
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FIGURE 11. Multiple path, Data Encryption Key group (Brocade 2011, 172) 
Once the encryption group is formed as in Figure 11, all encryption operations are 
managed as a group, and all the commands are issued from the present group 
leader. The group leader can change, but it is by default the switch that issued the 
create encryption group command. (Brocade 2011, 9-11.) 
7.2 Key Management System (KMS) and key lifecycle management 
Data is encrypted and decrypted by using the same data encryption key, so a DEK 
must be preserved for as long as the data is needed. Losing the DEK is similar to 
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data loss. Key management systems provide life cycle management for encryption 
keys by storing the keys for years or decades, if necessary. In the Brocade 
encryption switch environment, there are four stages in the life on an encryption 
key. The first stage in the key lifecycle is creation of the key by an encryption 
engine and encrypting the data with it. The second phase is key distribution to 
other encryption engines, if there are any, and storing the key into a key 
management system, referred to as key vault. The third stage is its lifetime, while 
the key is used to encrypt and decrypt data. The fourth and last stage is key 
expiration, termination and destroying. The last stage of the key's lifecycle is 
reached either manually by specifying the key to expire for just in case or if the 
encryption key is compromised. Key expiration may also happen automatically if 
there is maximum lifetime configured for the key to prevent it from becoming 
compromised. (Brocade 2011, 9-11; Bouchard 2012, 87-90.) 
During the second phase of the key lifecycle, when the key is stored to a key 
vault, it is first encrypted before being moved away from the BES FIPS 140-2 
Layer 3 security boundary. The term FIPS 140-2 Layer 3 boundary is used for the 
secure physical chassis of Brocade Encryption Switch, defined and approved by 
the United States federal government. By encrypting the data encryption key 
(DEK) before it is sent out from the FIPS boundary, it is protected from 
compromising in the process. 
The encryption key used to encrypt DEK is called key encryption key (KEK). Key 
management systems compatible with BES are divided into two categories: 
opaque key vault and trusted key exchange. An example of trusted and opaque 
key exchange is shown in Figure 12. In trusted key exchange, key vault and BES 
authenticate each other for example with a SSL certificate. This may vary between 
vendors. Most vendors also use a linked key, which is a symmetric key that is 
used to encrypt DEK before moving it over trusted exchange. In trusted key 
exchange, KEK refers to a link key that is the orange key in the upper section of 
Figure 12. In trusted key exchange, key vault is able to see the data encryption key 
as cleartext. 
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FIGURE 12. Trusted vs Opaque key exchange (Bouchard 2012, 89-90) 
In opaque key vault, key management never has access to the cleartext data 
encryption keys. Also, opaque key vault does not contain information on how the 
DEK was encrypted. The Brocade Encryption switch forces generating a Master 
Key (MK), which is used to encrypt DEKs before sending them out to the opaque 
key vault. Brocade Encryption Switch allows backing up the Master Key to a file 
or to a opaque key vault by encrypting it with a passphrase. It is also possible to 
back up the Master Key to a set of smart cards. (Bouchard 2012, 87-90; Erma 
2013.) 
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8 SAMPLE ENVIRONMENT 
A sample environment was build in order to test eavesdropping in practice. The 
sample environment included one server computer with Fibre Channel HBA, one 
storage array subsystem, one Brocade Encryption Switch, one key management 
system and a Fibre Channel 8 Gbps capable sniffer device. Red Hat Enterprise 
Linux was installed to the server computer, with one logical unit (LUN 0) 
assigned from storage array as a root volume. The server computer does not have 
local disks and it boots from SAN storage. Ideally the sample environment 
represents a modern datacenter with SAN fabric. 
8.1 First test scenario, man in the middle 
Figure 13 displays the first test set made, connecting the server and storage 
together with a single optical path through the Brocade Encryption switch. At this 
phase the BES is acting as a normal, non-encrypting SAN switch allowing the 
server and array to communicate with each other in cleartext. The upper part of 
Figure 13 represents how the server and storage array see their physical 
connection, as well as how it would be normally cabled. The lower part of Figure 
13 represents cabling and sniffer device installation during the test case. The 
sniffer device in the sample environment was manufactured by JDSU and its 
model is Xgig. 
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FIGURE 13. Test phase one 
As there is no encryption in this phase of the test, sniffered payload is the same 
from both prisms seen in Figure 13. In order to achieve such scenario in real life 
for eavesdropping purposes, one would need to break the optical circuit and 
connect both ends through a splitter, which would be likely to create an alert to 
the party responsible for the SAN fabric. During the first eavesdropping test the 
operating system was installed to the server computer. The server computer has 
one logical unit allocated from the storage array, mapped as LUN 0 and size of 30 
GB. 
As a side note, in all modern operating systems password brute forcing does not 
work well to the server directly, as there is probably a limited number of attempts 
before the account will be locked.  
During the first eavesdropping test, the hashed root password was captured by the 
JDSU Xgig when written to files called /etc/passwd and /etc/shadow. Gaining this 
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information, an attacker is able to brute force the root password without the 
account being locked in the process. Also, because eavesdropping revelead also 
the operating system version, hash mechanism can be easily searched and so-
called rainbow tables can be used to obtain cleartext root password faster. Gaining 
hashed passwords is not only limited for the installation of the operating system, 
but also every time when the server computer reads the hashed password to its 
memory when a user is logging in. 
8.2 Trying sniffering with clipon coupler 
Similarly to how the optical signal was split to the eavesdropper device in Figure 
13, the second test scenario in this sample environment was to achieve the same 
without need to break the optical circuit, thus being undetected. There are several 
manufacturers for clip-on fiber couplers on the market and such a coupler costs 
from USD 500 to up to USD 10 000, depending on quality and deamplification 
the device will create to the actual link. In figure 14, there is an example of a clip 
on device designed for single-mode fiber optic, running signal on light 
wavelenghts of 1300 ~1500 nm, with insertion loss of less than 7 dB. 
 
FIGURE 14. Kingfisher's OPT130 Clip-on coupler (Kingfisher international 
2013) 
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It seems that most clip on couplers are for single-mode cables only, but there are 
some for multi-mode cables as well. Because it was hard to find one for the multi-
mode cable, a single-mode clip on coupler was used for the next test. 
Long distance inter switch links in Fibre Channel SAN are very commonly 
implemented by single-mode cables. Another SAN switch was obtained to the 
sample environment and set up as described in Figure 15. The single-mode cable 
connecting the two switches was not more than 3 meters long and fiber optic 
modules on both switches were extended long wavelenght SFPs, running on 1330 
nm. 
Fibre cut and split for eavesdropper
4
JDSU Xgig
ethernet
1 2 3
Prism 
splitter
Prism 
splitter
Disk array subsystem Server computer
71
coupler
0 0fingle-mode
 
FIGURE 15. Test phase two 
Fiber optic modules were broken during the test because receivers got too much 
input power, as the modules were sized to connect up to 40 kilometer paths, while 
the fiber in between was only a few meters long. 
The decision was made to abort the test, as it had already been seen it is possible 
to steal data payloads being transferred. It seems relatively easy to use a clip-on 
coupler for the working single-mode link as the coupler does not badly harm the 
coating of the cable. 
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8.3 BES encryption enabled 
After the unsuccessful clip-on coupling test, the sample environment was returned 
to the similar state as in Figure 13, but now Encryption Engine was enabled and 
LUN 0 encrypted by BES. As mentioned in Chapter 7 and Figure 9 on page 21, 
the encryption engine redirects all frames through virtual initiator and virtual 
target ports that belong to the encryption engine itself. After crypto-target-
container was created for the disk array target port and the server's HBA and LUN 
configuration brought in to the CTC, Brocade Encryption Switch created 
redirection zones for the encryption engine. Each device logged in to the SAN 
fabric has FCID, and so has the encryption engine. Figure 16 displays cabling and 
physical and virtual ports for this scenario with the following FCIDs assigned to 
each port: 
 switch port - FCID 
 port 0 - 0x010000 
 port 7 - 0x010700 
 virtual initiator - 0x012401 
 virtual target - 0x012001 
Fibre cut and split for eavesdropper
JDSU Xgig
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splitter
Prism 
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BES
EE-enabled
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V-initiator V-target
 
FIGURE 16. Third test scenario with encryption enabled 
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Without encryption and redirection zones, when the server sends an I/O request to 
storage array, it would send it from source FCID address of 0x010700, to 
destination address of 0x010000. After encryption is enabled and CTC 
configured, when the server sends an I/O request, it is actually going to virtual 
target in destination address of 0x012001.  
In order to make sure encryption is actually there in place, one more LU was 
allocated to the server: LUN 1, size of 50 MB. The logical unit was formatted and 
mounted as ext4 filesystem /testi/ to Linux. After mounting the filesystem, the 
following command was issued to write a string to a file: 
 'echo "HELLO LAMK" > /testi/hellolamk.txt' 
In Figure 17, there is a print screen from the analyzer software that used to capture 
these FCP frames, highlighting FCID for source and destination during each 
exchange. First the server issues an SCSI write command to the LUN 1, to a 
specific Logical Block Address (LBA), destinated to virtual target with exchange 
ID (OX_ID) of 0x01A4. Payload and acknowledgement frames with the same 
OX_ID are all between the physical server initiator port and virtual target port. As 
seen on the right-hand side of Figure 17, payload is plain text. 
 
FIGURE 17. Captured frames with plain text exchange ID (0x01A4) 
Payload of these ASCII characters fit in to one 2112 byte payload slot, but there is 
one more payload (FC4SData) frame transmitted, ending the specific sequence. 
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Furthermore, we can see in Figure 18 that the encryption engine encrypts the 
payload and sends it over from virtual initiator to physical target in sequence 
0x2096. Again real source and destination FCIDs are visible in captured data, and 
we can also see that the same payload as we were previously able to read 
containing 'HELLO LAMK' -string, is now encrypted ciphertext. 
 
FIGURE 18. Captured frames with encrypted exchange ID (0x2096) 
This test scenario proves that the frame is indeed not plaintext after the encryption 
engine, but whether it proves it is properly encrypted following AES256-XTS 
encryption algorithm is a good question and this thesis will not be able to answer 
this question. 
8.4 Metadata of an encrypted Logical Unit 
One more test to be done was to clone an encrypted LUN and map it to another 
server, outside the encryption engine context. The expected result would be that 
there is 32 bytes of metadata on each LBA in range 1 to 16, and LBA 0 is 
plaintext. The server used to read the cloned LUN data was Linux and hexdump 
was used to read the LUN. The crypto-target-container configuration for the LUN 
is displayed in the upper part of Figure 19, displaying key identification for the 
DEK (KEY ID) used to encrypt this specific LUN. The lower part of Figure 19 
displays the results of hexdump output at around beginning of LBA1. Block size 
being 512 bytes, LBA 0 represents bytes 0…511 (0x000…0x1FF), LBA 1 
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represents bytes 512…1023 (0x200…0x3FF) and so on. So there definately is the 
key ID, but Brocade never revealed what the other part of the metadata actually 
contains. They said that it is company secret. However, as the documentation 
says, there is metadata on each LBA in range of 1 to 16. 
 
FIGURE 19. LU metadata on LBA 1 
The last two bytes of LBA0 in Figure 19 represents boot signature in master boot 
sector, thus verifying that what Brocade has documented about LBA0 being 
always plaintext, is true. 
8.5 WWN spoofing 
There is a known exploit using FC-GS-4 spec query commands to obtain Fabric 
zoneset from HBA initiator. This allows the attacker to list WorldWideNames for 
the initiators in each zone and may allow the attacker to change its own WWN to 
match other server computer's WWN, thus allowing the attacker to access Logical 
Units visible to original WWN. 
Spoofing was tried with Linux and Emulex HBA. There is a utility pack for linux 
called fcoe-utils, which can be used to query the zoneset. It was found out that by 
default SAN switch settings, Brocade did not allow queries, but Cisco MDS 
switches did. At the time of testing, Cisco did not have a fix for this exploit, but at 
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the time of writing this, the issue is fixed in Cisco NX-OS release 5.0(4b)E3 and 
later (Cisco support 2013). 
Emulex firmware was modified to spoof WWN and tried to access LUN mapped 
to the server with the same WWN. On both Cisco and Brocade fabrics, the result 
was the same; fabric name server rejected fabric login for the attacker HBA, 
because the same WWN is already logged in from another FCID address. If the 
original server is rebooted and then the attacker tries to login to the fabric, it will 
be successful and the attacker is able to read data from the LUN. 
QLogic HBA drivers for Linux are open-source and allow to issue fabric 
disconnect (FDISC) command with false source FCID to the fabric nameserver. 
This would make it possible to force logout from the original server and allow 
attacker HBA to login and capture the data from the original LUN. In the sample 
environment this was never tested, but it was discussed in theory. Such attack 
vector may exist that an attacker purchases space and SAN storage from a service 
provider for the attacker's own server computer that is cabable of querying SAN 
fabric zonesets and spoofing WWN, as well as force logout for the original server 
from the fabric. 
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9 SUMMARY 
This thesis studied the possibility to eavesdrop a Fibre Channel Storage Area 
Network. In theory and practice this is fairly easy with proper equipment and 
access to facilities containing fibre optic cables. It is a bit more difficult when 
eavesdropping the traffic without breaking the optical link, but this definitely 
seems to be possible even though the thesis failed to prove it in practice. Real life 
unveilings on Verizon and NSA also speak for this, with illegal eavesdropping 
device found from Verizon and NSA being able to capture traffic from undersea 
cables. 
During the eavesdropping tests it was found that a huge amount of information is 
revelead through SAN if an operating system is installed to a SAN attached 
storage. The thesis revelead the hashed root password for the installed Linux 
operating system, allowing brute forcing the password to cleartext without the 
account being locked for too many attempts. Other information, such as IP 
addresses, services and firewall rules are also stored with the operating system and 
such information may allow the attacker to find another route in and to hijack the 
server computer.  
Spoofing the World Wide Name of a server adapter was also tested. Spoofing the 
WWN may allow the attacker to read data from storage logical units belonging to 
other server computers in the SAN. A spoofing attack seems to be possible if 
there is another way around to force the original server to log out from the SAN 
fabric, but if the original server is online and logged in to the SAN fabric, it seems 
all SAN switches reject the fabric login from the attacker's server adapter. Also, it 
is likely that a syslog event is seen by monitoring and the attacker is quickly 
caught. 
Brocade Encryption Switch was able to encrypt data sent over the Fibre Channel 
network, making it impossible for the attacker to read data in cleartext. However, 
the first link between the server computer and BES is always cleartext, but at least 
the data is not sent over a long distance as plaintext. 
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The thesis was able to solve the question whether it is possible to eavesdrop Fibre 
Channel Storage Area Network; the answer is yes. Organizations that need to 
protect their data from being exposed to unauthorized persons should definitely 
encrypt all data and payloads sent over any network, including Fibre Channel 
SAN. The thesis was capable of proving eavesdropping on this level, one can only 
imagine what NSA is capable of doing with their underwater eavesdropper in a 
submarine. 
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